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Policy recommendations
\ Launch new funding formats 
to support self-determined civic  
engagement for peace 
GFFO, BMZ, MoI and state governments should pro-
vide decentralised funding through civic education in-
stitutions (political foundations, bpb, lpbs, ifa) for two 
types of addressees conducting civic education for 
peace programmes: Civic and peace education organi-
sations and direct funding for Syrian- and Afghan-led 
initiatives. They should provide longer-term project 
funding, funding for independent initiatives, funding to 
rent meeting spaces and support unbureaucratic and 
transparent funding application processes. The GFFO 
should consider providing funding in addition to exist-
ing funding lines by the MoI to join expertise on civic 
education (MoI) and peace support (GFFO).  
\ Link Afghan and Syrian civic  
education for peace initiatives in  
Germany to peace processes
The GFFO should act as a facilitator in linking Afghan- 
and Syrian-led peacemaking initiatives in Germany 
with official track 1, 2 and 3 peace processes mediated 
by bodies like the United Nations (participation,  
advisory roles). 
\ Engage refugees and migrants as 
peace advocates
German policymakers—especially of the German Fed-
eral Foreign Office (GFFO), the Federal Ministries of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and of 
the Interior (MoI), and federal states—and educational 
organisations should draw upon the engagement of 
refugees and migrants from Afghanistan and Syria as 
agents of change who have a positive influence on 
peace processes. 
\ Create civic engagement for peace 
programmes that offer refugees and 
migrants in Germany opportunities to 
engage themselves in peace for their 
countries of origin
Civic and peace education organisations (such as adult 
education centres, Civil Peace Service—Ziviler Friedens- 
dienst) should jointly develop new civic engagement 
for peace programmes that refugees and migrants 
themselves can join to engage for peace for their coun-
try of origin. These programmes should build on refu-
gees’ and migrants’ past experiences of war, politics 
and future visions specific to their respective country 
of origin so that they are meaningful for those  
engaged and the population groups they represent. 
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Introduction
In this Policy Brief, we argue that the significant po-
tential of Afghan and Syrian refugees and migrants 
in Germany and beyond as peace advocates and 
change agents in contributing to peace processes in 
Afghanistan and Syria must be recognised. Today, Af-
ghans and Syrians constitute the highest numbers of 
immigrants in Germany and Europe. As of 31 March 
2020, Germany’s population included 798,999 individ-
uals with Syrian and 265,192 with Afghan citizenship 
(BAMF, 2020, p. 120). Furthermore, because the Afghan 
conflict has been ongoing for 40 years, the share of 
persons with German citizenship is comparatively 
high among persons of descent from Afghanistan.  
By persons of descent from Afghanistan and Syria,  
we mean individuals with refugee status, those who 
have been naturalised as German citizens and per-
sons who migrated to Germany for reasons unrelated 
to conflict (such as work, education).
Until now, German policymakers have largely re-
frained from tapping their potential to act for peace 
for at least three reasons: 
1\ Afghans and Syrians are often still perceived as 
refugees and migrants who are recipients of be-
nefits (protection, aid, services) rather than indi-
viduals with agency. Also, they are largely depri-
ved of their agency to be politically engaged. For 
example, in national elections, foreign nationals 
cannot vote, and they are not allowed to form po-
litical parties in Germany. (
2\ When German policymakers consult them or 
support them in their commitment to their 
country of origin, they are narrowly ascribed the 
role of contributing to humanitarian and de-
velopment aims (editorial, FMR 60, 2019)—igno-
ring political aspirations. 
3\ Afghans and Syrians are assumed to seek local in-
tegration in Germany, which civic education pro-
grammes and funding lines aim to support (that 
is civic participation, language proficiency, voca-
tional training, social engagement). There is no 
funding line that would allow persons of Afghan 
and Syrian descent to initiate peace initiatives for 
Afghanistan and Syria in Germany. This is why, in 
contrast to current practice, there is an urgent 
need to alter German policies to allow for the poli-
tical participation of immigrants in peace efforts 
for their country of origin. 
Scholars and practitioners agree that refugees’ and 
migrants’ involvement in peace processes renders 
these processes more sustainable. They further recog-
nise that exile populations should be involved in con-
fronting the past to increase long-term prospects for 
peace. Peace processes are inherently political. Inte-
grating refugees, migrants and naturalised citizens 
into peace processes opens a new political field that 
civic engagement for peace needs to address. To not 
leave this field to political or religious extremist 
groups, German policymakers need to strengthen in-
centives that enable adults in Germany to participate 
in civic engagement for peace for their countries of 
origin in a self-determined manner and, eventually, to 
facilitate translating these into participation in more 
formal peace processes. Until now, in contrast, the 
lack of tailored support for comparable civic engage-
ment for peace initiatives inside Afghanistan and Syria 
as well as among Afghans and Syrians living abroad 
has catalysed political fragmentation and led to the 
widespread lack of concrete, broad-based political pro-
grammes and long-term visions for reform in the  
Afghan and Syrian peace processes. In the following, 
we show how these groups’ support of civic engage-
ment for peace in their origin countries can contrib-
ute to peace processes in Syria and Afghanistan.
Peacemaking in displacement:  
Mitigating risks and strengthening 
peace advocates 
Immigrants from conflict countries often remain en-
gaged in political processes in their countries of ori-
gin. Exile populations can act as both peace wreckers 
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and peacemakers. How their relations with the coun-
try of origin plays out often depends on the nature of 
conflict “at home”, the international political “cli-
mate” and national policies in the country of resi-
dence that limit or support political activities of for-
eign nationals. 
In Germany, policymakers often fear that any form of 
politicisation among foreign nationals might em-
bolden political conflict in their country of origin or 
in Germany, or may lead to the emergence of extrem-
ist groups. We, however, argue that inaction risks giv-
ing space to radicalisation and the lack of commit-
ment for promoting inclusive dialogue and broader 
processes of national reconciliation. Two examples 
illustrate the complex relationship between sup-
pressed versus encouraged political (non)engagement 
and conflict versus peace(building):  
1\ The situation among individuals of Turkish ori-
gin in Germany demonstrates how a lack of sup-
port for political dialogue has led to political seg-
regation and conflict between a) supporters of 
Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
and political refugees who fled persecution by the 
Turkish government to seek refuge in Germany; 
and b) conflict between persons of Turkish and 
Kurdish descent. Kurds belong to an ethnic mi-
nority who have been discriminated against and 
persecuted by the Turkish government, which 
sees them as affiliated with the Kurdistan Work-
ers’ Party (PKK) that it has outlawed as a ‘terrorist 
group’. The close relationship between the AKP 
and some Turkish institutions and between the 
PKK and Kurdish institutions in Germany has led 
to a hardening of positions, which highlights the 
risk of ignoring ‘foreign’ politics in Germany. 
2\ During the Cold War, German authorities, the 
media and the public supported Islamist Afghan 
exile groups, especially those who represented 
the fundamentalist Afghan resistance (mujahe-
din) in the conflict with the Afghan government 
and the Soviet intervention forces until 1989. This 
emboldened the Islamist factions who started a 
civil war after the fall of the Soviet-backed regime 
in 1992 and determine Afghan politics and the 
forty-year conflict until today. Such one-sided 
support missed the opportunity for inclusive dia-
logue with Afghan groups of all political spec-
trums, and it demonstrates how the consequenc-
es of such policies created conflict trajectories 
which remain problematic until today. 
Against this backdrop, we argue for a policy change 
that supports self-determined civic engagement for 
peace programmes and the emergence of peace advo-
cates. Individuals often remain part of networks, also 
in their country of descent, for instance through so-
cial media or personal contacts, and possess in-depth 
knowledge of that country’s needs and interests. This 
knowledge would make them ideal bridge-builders. 
However, in Germany, such peace initiatives are rare 
because their engagement is hampered by a lack of 
funding and support. For persons from conflict coun-
tries interested in joining such initiatives, civic en-
gagement for peace initiatives in Germany could po-
tentially serve to: 
   \ share experiences of conflict and war (con-
fronting the past);
   \ jointly develop peace narratives (e.g. peaceful 
visions for the future, building bridges across 
different political currents, discuss under-
standings of justice);
   \ learn mediation and conflict management 
skills which they can apply at the neighbour-
hood, municipality, state and national level, but 
also in peace processes (pro inclusiveness, dia-
logue, reconciliation).
In this manner, civic engagement for peace initia-
tives can serve as spaces where inclusive dialogue 
can be held (including different age groups, women, 
persons of different religious and political affilia-
tions) and confidence among participants be built. 
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non-violent conflict resolution and concentrates on 
developing practical skills for a peaceful transforma-
tion of conflicts at the individual and group level. 
Peace education offered to immigrants from conflict 
settings to date mainly consists of programmes that 
foster individual peace skills for the integration in 
Germany or an individual’s reintegration into their 
country of origin after their return. What is missing 
in project work, programming and conceptually, how-
ever, is a collaboration of civic and peace education 
actors that allows immigrants to engage in peace in 
their country of origin while they live, and often have 
to or intend to remain, in Germany. This is what we 
term “civic engagement for peace for immigrants 
from conflict settings for their origin countries”.
Civic engagement for peace wants individuals to be-
come change-makers in conflict transformation by 
allowing them to develop knowledge and skills for 
conflict resolution and decision-making. Funding 
broad-based grassroots initiatives for dialogue and 
exchange across social class, different age groups, po-
litical convictions, interests and “generations of im-
migration” (cf. Meininghaus & Mielke, 2019) could 
achieve this. Among persons of Afghan and Syrian de-
scent in Germany, we find that different generations 
of immigrants since the 1960s remain largely discon-
nected from one another, thus limiting the prospects 
of mutual support and dialogue. By supporting differ-
ent formats for exchange, Afghan- and Syrian-led ini-
tiatives can begin to bridge these gaps. Ideally, the de-
sign of these initiatives should allow for exploring 
different political systems without prejudices, for 
critical reflection of past experiences, developing fu-
ture visions and joint learning. It should be up to par-
ticipants from Afghan and Syrian descent within 
these initiatives to decide where their needs and top-
ics for civic engagement for peace programmes are, 
not least to ensure that they are historically ground-
ed in their own experiences. Such programmes must 
not seek to reproduce German politics but be open 
While it is crucial that these fora represent safe spac-
es1 , they can offer valuable opportunities for discuss-
ing politicisation and divergent political interests 
constructively. They may also be a starting point for 
developing concrete suggestions on including 
peace-focused civil society groups into existing peace 
processes. While we find that refugees’ needs, knowl-
edge and interests are often rarely represented in offi-
cial talks, these initiatives open up an avenue for 
broader political participation. This is not limited to, 
but can also include, building knowledge of transi-
tional justice formats that have proven successful in 
other contexts and developing ideas of how these 
might be applicable to similar processes at communi-
ty or national level in Afghanistan and Syria.
German policymakers—especially of the GFFO, the 
BMZ and the MoI—and educational organisations ur-
gently need to acknowledge and subsequently sup-
port the potential role of persons of Afghan and Syri-
an descent as agents of change, who can foster 
constructive dialogue processes and act as important 
bridge-builders for constituencies in their country of 
origin. Peace is not only crafted through interven-
tions and programmes in (post-)conflict countries 
but also through interventions and programmes that 
may start in Germany. 
Civic engagement for peace in countries of origin:  
A critical gap
A review of civic and peace education programmes 
and measures in Germany shows a critical gap. On 
the one hand, civic education for refugees has fo-
cused on providing support for integration into Ger-
man society, through language courses, vocational 
skills-building, social engagement for civic participa-
tion and democracy-learning/ citizenship education. 
On the other hand, peace education (in Germany: 
“peace pedagogy”) points out ways of constructive,  
 
1 \  In the Syrian case, for persons critical of the regime, this entails the 
risk of intimidation of participants through the Syrian regime and 
their family members who live inside Syria (cf. (Amnesty Internation-
al, 2011). Initiatives should receive support to establish their own rules 
and mechanisms to mitigate such risks.
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New funding formats supporting self-determined 
civic engagement for peace
To implement civic engagement for peace pro-
grammes and projects, the GFFO, BMZ, MoI and feder-
al states should also create new funding formats for 
such initiatives in Germany. This involves: 
1\ Decentralised funding through institutions for 
civic education (political foundations, bpb, lpbs, 
ifa) for two funding lines: a) funding for civic and 
peace education organisations and b) direct fund-
ing for Syrian- and Afghan-led initiatives. Our re-
search shows that in earlier state-funded human-
itarian and development initiatives initiated by 
Afghans and Syrians, for instance, members of 
such associations have felt forced to adapt their 
projects and programmes to available funding 
lines. This is problematic because donor priorities 
have determined their contents, even when it 
was apparent to applicants that funding targets 
did not address actual needs. This problem is also 
reflected in measures inside Germany that largely 
aim for so-called systemic integration such as 
schooling, vocational training, etc., but which ne-
glect significant needs for psycho-social support 
and political engagement for peace. Therefore, it 
is important that new funding lines should pro-
vide structural and financial support, but leave 
space for the contents of these initiatives to be 
developed by participants themselves in line with 
their own perceived priorities. Initiatives of this 
sort require places to meet and long time frames 
to work towards the skills required and while 
conflict remains ongoing. Reducing the bureau-
cratic requirements and procedures when apply-
ing for funding to form associations in Germany 
would also help to ensure equal access to funding 
across social and intellectual divides. For Syrian- 
and Afghan-led initiatives, civic peace service 
personnel (Forum Civil Peace Service, forumZFD) 
with significant expertise in peace initiative sup-
port in conflict countries could offer support as 
consultants and provide mediation—however, 
towards new ideas of civic education for peace mean-
ingful to Afghans and Syrians to also attract interest 
among others from Afghan and Syrian descent to 
join. This is especially important for persons who ar-
rived in Germany as adults without access to the Ger-
man education system. For many individuals born in 
Afghanistan and Syria, respectively, who went to 
school there, school curricula did not include critical 
learning about different forms of political systems 
(e.g. different forms of democracies, electoral sys-
tems). In Afghanistan, we find no coherent histo-
ry-writing from within Afghanistan for more than 40 
years of war. In Syria, school curricula in this field 
consist of state propaganda in line with Ba’th party 
ideology (with the short-lived exception of areas con-
trolled by other military and civilian groups since 
2011). 
Thus, newly designed civic engagement for peace 
programmes should entail a high degree of self-deter-
mination. They can also provide fora for a critical en-
gagement with their own histories of war and devel-
op political visions for a more peaceful future, 
including ideas for transitional justice processes. His-
torical literacy, the development of willingness and 
skills to confront the home country’s and one’s own 
individual conflictive past constitutes a crucial learn-
ing challenge, which could be supported by voluntary 
conflict-sensitive moderation (as practised by the Fo-
rum Civil Peace Service–forumZFD, for instance). We 
argue that civic education projects for adults are cru-
cial as they provide a forum for confronting the past 
and can form a critical, independent political mind-
set. They can also encourage dialogue among persons 
of Afghan and Syrian descent, respectively. Given that 
many have made Germany their home and are here 
to stay, this is all the more important. Therefore, Ger-
man policymakers—the BMI, GFFO and BMZ—should 
set incentives for education organisations and civic 
conflict transformation organisations to reconceptu-
alise civic peace engagement programmes among 
immigrants of Afghan and Syrian descent in 
Germany. 
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Peace processes themselves are in urgent need of  
reform and of becoming more sustainable. Consider 
these facts:
   \ Official peace processes were only set up in less 
than half of all wars and conflicts globally be-
tween 1946 and 2003 (most others are military 
victories or unresolved) (Bercovitch & Fretter, 
2004, p. 29) 
   \ Only about one-quarter of these cases end with 
a peace agreement (1946–2015) (Kreutz, 2010,  
p. 246)
   \ Half of all peace agreements collapse within the 
first five years (Convergne, 2016, pp. 144–145). 
Despite differences of the Afghan/Syrian peace pro-
cesses and  the new emphasis on “inclusive” peace 
processes with civil society, these figures point to se-
vere flaws. Among these, the influence of patron 
states (that finance armed groups, for instance) and 
peace spoilers are well-known hindrances to longer-
term peace. Another flaw is that both peace processes 
are characterised by a widespread lack of a) political 
groups/movements that have emerged organically 
and enjoy broad-based grassroots support and b) con-
crete, publicly known and feasible proposals by pro-
tagonistsfor reform in different sectors of govern-
ment (e.g. security sector, education, economics, 
agriculture).2  Civic engagement for peace pro-
grammes represent a crucial step towards reforming 
peace processes by addressing these highly critical 
gaps: To contribute to the formulation of concrete 
ideas from a broad, bottom-up flow of informed de-
bates originating in self-determined agenda setting. 
In cases where these initiatives wish to be included 
into official peace processes (e.g. tracks 2 and 3), the 
GFFO and the United Nations, for instance, should de-
velop transparent criteria for such initiatives to par-
ticipate in official negotiations and/or to act as advi-
sory bodies to these. 
2 \  Both processes have in common that in Germany and 
elsewhere, entire privately initiated peace processes creat-
ed by Afghans and Syrians have emerged, which usually 
reject foreign presence and interference (cf. Meininghaus 
& Mielke, 2019).
only when expressly called for by these initia-
tives. The BMZ should examine under which con-
ditions this is possible. 
2\ The GFFO should also consider providing funds, 
adding to existing funding lines for civic educa-
tion by the MoI, both of which should liaise. The 
MoI is experienced in supporting civic education 
programmes in Germany, while the GFFO has ex-
pertise in providing peace support in conflict 
countries. They should join their fields of exper-
tise to provide funding for civic engagement for 
peace initiatives which can, eventually, inform 
the peace processes for these origin countries. For 
this purpose, GFFO and the BMZ might need to 
adopt new types of funding lines without replac-
ing existing ones (like BENGO, CIM). All funding 
allocations should be based on clear funding cri-
teria, make decisions on allocation or refusal of 
funding transparent and support a self-deter-
mined, autonomous conduct of broad-based 
grassroots initiatives. 
Link Afghan and Syrian civic engagement for peace 
initiatives in Germany to peace processes
Civic engagement for peace initiatives could be 
linked to peace processes in the long-term. By build-
ing upon individuals’ knowledge of politics and life 
in Afghanistan and Syria and combining these with 
new ideas, civic education for peace initiatives can 
become fora for developing long-term political vi-
sions and ideas for feasible reforms with which Af-
ghans and Syrians can identify. So far, our research 
shows that such visions—and support for developing 
these—have been noticeably scarce in both peace 
processes. The fact that significant numbers of per-
sons of Afghan descent have lived in Germany for up 
to 40 years without having had a chance to engage in 
such initiatives, while the peace process has not 
yielded sustainable results, demonstrates how this 
opportunity has been missed so far for two 
generations. 
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Introducing civic engagement for peace initiatives 
for persons of Afghan and Syrian descent, and possi-
bly for those from other conflict settings, requires 
long-term support. Given the failures of peace pro-
cesses around the world, we argue that such support 
for self-determined, bottom-up and critically in-
formed visions for peace in peaceful environments 
can represent a significant step towards positive 
change. 
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